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DEFENDERS OF WILDLIFE v. EPA: RECONCILING THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT AND CLEAN WATER ACT OR
FURTHER CONFUSING THE STATUTORY OVERLAP?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Seeking to address environmental concerns regarding the
quality of the nation's waterways, Congress enacted the Clean Water
Act (CWA) in 1972 to eliminate the release of toxic pollutants and
regulate the level of pollution in fishable and navigable waters.'
The CWA provided for the establishment of the National Pollutant
Discharge Elimination System (NPDES), which fulfills the CWA's
objectives concerning the regulation of water pollution. 2 The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized to enforce the
provisions of the CWA and oversee the NPDES. 3 Under the terms
of the CWA, a state may apply to the EPA for the authority to administer its own permit program for the discharge of pollutants
into navigable waters. 4 Upon receiving the state's application, the
EPA Administrator "shall approve each submitted program" if the
state demonstrates compliance with the criteria enumerated in the
5
statute.
In Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA (Defenders of Wildlfe),6 the petitioners-Defenders of Wildlife, the Center for Biological Diversity
and an Arizona citizen-claimed that the EPA violated its duty
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) when it approved the
State of Arizona's pollution permit application. 7 Specifically, petitioners alleged that the EPA did not satisfactorily take into account
1. See Elizabeth Rosan, EPA's Approach to Endangered Species Protection in State
Clean Water Act Programs, 30 ENVnL. L. 447, 452 (2000) (explaining Congress's purpose in enacting CWA).
2. See id. (describing CWA's systematic structure).
3. See id. at 453 (explaining administrative hierarchy under CWA).
4. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000) (setting forth process and requirements
necessary for application and approval of state authority to administer pollution
permit program).
5. See id. (describing guidelines governing EPA Administrator's approval of
state application).
6. 420 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2005).
7. See id. at 954-55 (describing petitioners' request for review of EPA transfer
decision). The court additionally noted that three separate parties intervened in
support of the EPA's decision, including the National Association of Home Builders, the Arizona Chamber of Commerce and Arizona. See id. at 955. These parties
agreed with the EPA's grant of Arizona's transfer application, but were dissatisfied
with certain aspects of the EPA's administrative practices and reasoning. See id.
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the effect of the permitting authority transfer on endangered species and their critical habitats, as the ESA required.8 Petitioners
claimed that the EPA's decision to approve Arizona's transfer application was arbitrary and capricious because the EPA failed to consider all the necessary and relevant information required for
approval. 9

In its ruling, the Ninth Circuit addressed whether the EPA possessed the statutory authority under both the CWA and the ESA to
consider effects on endangered species when reviewing and deciding state pollution permit applications. 10 After considering the language of the ESA, congressional intent and relevant case law, the
Ninth Circuit held that the EPA had the authority to consider possible harm to endangered species in making its transfer decision.1 1
The court found, however, that the EPA's failure to analyze the relevant information and its reliance on a deficient Biological Opinion resulted in an arbitrary and capricious decision to approve
12
Arizona's application.
This Note asserts that the Ninth Circuit's decision to vacate the
EPA's approval of Arizona's pollution permitting program improperly extended the EPA's authority under the CWA and ESA. 13 Part
II sets forth the facts surrounding the case. 14 Part III explains the
pertinent statutory and regulatory provisions of the CWA and ESA
and examines significant United States Supreme Court and circuit
court decisions interpreting these statutes. 15 Part IV discusses the
Ninth Circuit's analysis of the EPA's transfer decision and agency
8. See id. (noting petitioners' specific objections to transfer decision). For a
further discussion of CWA's provision permitting states to apply for transfer of
pollution permitting authority from the EPA, see infra notes 40-48 and accompanying text.
9. See id. (describing petitioners' claim concerning substance of EPA's transfer decision).
10. See id. at 950 (explaining background of case and disagreement over
scope of EPA's decision-making authority).
11. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 971 (finding transfer decision constituted agency action that triggered section 7(a) (2) consultation obligations).
12. See id. at 977 (noting EPA and Biological Opinion's failure to consider
adequately transfer's indirect effects on endangered species). For a further discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the EPA's decision under the arbitrary and
capricious standard, see infra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
13. See id. at 979 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (finding majority opinion incorrectly interpreted ESA expansively).
14. For a discussion of the factual background in Defenders of Wildlife, see infra
notes 19-39 and accompanying text.
15. For a discussion of the pertinent statutes, relevant regulatory provisions
and significant cases addressing the issues covered in Defenders of Wildlife, see infra
notes 40-92 and accompanying text.
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obligations under the CWA and ESA. 1 6 Part V analyzes the court's
interpretation of the statutes and its position opposing the conclusions of circuit courts addressing the same issue. 17 Part VI discusses
the impact the Ninth Circuit's opinion will have on future state pollution permitting programs and on the adjudication of these environmental issues in subsequent cases. 18
II.

FACTS

The dispute in Defenders of Wildlife focused on the EPA's decision to approve Arizona's application for the transfer of pollution
permitting authority from the EPA to the state. 19 The State of Arizona first submitted its pollution permit program application to the
EPA on January 14, 2002.20 After receiving this request, the EPA
determined that its consideration of Arizona's CWA permitting program application constituted a federal action that invoked the requisite compliance with ESA section 7(a) (2). 2 1 ESA section 7(a) (2)
requires the EPA to make certain that any action it approves, funds
or undertakes will not present a likely threat of harm to endangered species or their critical habitats. 22 The EPA can satisfy this
requirement through consultation with the Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and the National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) .23
16. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's analysis of the issues in Defenders of
Wildlife, see infra notes 93-134 and accompanying text.
17. For an analysis of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Defenders of Wildlife, see
infra notes 135-61 and accompanying text.
18. For a discussion of the potential implications of the Ninth Circuit's decision in Defenders of Wildlife, see infra notes 162-72 and accompanying text.
19. See Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 950 (9th Cir. 2005) (describing EPA's authorization to consider impact of CWA decisions on endangered species as principal issue in case).
20. See id. at 952 (setting forth chronology of events involved in case). See also
Application to Administer the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,916, 49,917 (Aug. 1, 2002) (stating when EPA
received application materials).
21. See Application to Administer the NPDES Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,917
(explaining section 7(a)(2) of ESA imposes legal obligation "separate and distinct"
from EPA's authority under CWA).
22. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a) (2) (2000) (prescribing agency duties to protect
endangered species). The statute provides:
[e]ach Federal agency shall, in consultation with and with the assistance
of the Secretary, insure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out
by such agency .. .is not likely to jeopardize the continued existence of
any endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction
or adverse modification of habitat of such species which is determined by
the Secretary ....

See id.
23. See Rosan, supra note 1, at 459 (explaining ESA section 7 statutory requirements for protection of endangered species).
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After receiving Arizona's application, the EPA stated that it would
not issue a final decision until the conclusion of the consultation
process.24

While completing the consultation process, Arizona's FWS of25
fice voiced significant concerns regarding the proposed transfer.
The FWS noted that the ESA section 7 consultation requirement
resulted in the implementation of "mitigating measures" to assist in
preserving species' habitats. 26 The FWS expressed concern that, in
the absence of compulsory consultation, Arizona would grant permits without such measures. 27 Prior to issuing the Biological Opinion summarizing its analysis of the impacts of the transfer on
endangered species and critical habitats, the FWS office staff concluded that the "loss of protections to species resulting from the
section 7 process" could cause potentially harmful effects and there28
fore must be considered in the conclusive Biological Opinion.
The EPA responded that it could not ground its transfer decision
on that basis because it lacked the legal authority to consider the
"non-water-quality-related impacts" pertaining to permitting
programs.29

In response to this difference of opinion, the EPA and FWS
staff documented each agency's position in an "Interagency Evaluation Document," which transferred oversight authority of the Biological Opinion's completion to certain directors and
administrators of the EPA, FWS and NMFS.30 Following a consulta24. See Application to Administer the NPDES Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 49,917
(announcing Arizona's transfer application and process for application review).
25. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 952 (discussing FWS consultation prior
to EPA approval of Arizona's pollution permitting transfer application).
26. See id. (observing benefits arising from mandatory section 7 consultations
concerning previous federally issued pollution permits).
27. See id. (noting lack of mitigating measures could produce harmful effects
on listed endangered species, including southwestern willow flycatcher, Pima pineapple cactus, Huachuca water umbel and cactus ferruginous pygmy owl).
28. See id. at 951-52 (citing 50 C.F.R. pt. 402.14(h) (2005)) (describing Biological Opinion as including summary of information forming basis of opinion, comprehensive discussion of proposed action's effects on endangered species or
critical habitats, and FWS's opinion concerning whether proposed action would
likely endanger survival of listed species or cause destruction or harmful alteration
of critical habitats).
29. See id. at 952-53 (explaining scope of EPA's authority regarding transfer
decisions).
30. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 953 (noting that Memorandum of
Agreement between EPA, FWS and NMFS provides that "Interagency Evaluation
Document" shifts control over Biological Opinion to Deputy Assistant Administrator at EPA, Director of FWS and Director of NMFS). See also Memorandum of
Agreement Between the Environmental Protection Agency, Fish and Wildlife Service and National Marine Fisheries Service Regarding Enhanced Coordination
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tion among the three agencies, the FWS Field Supervisor issued a
Biological Opinion recommending approval of the transfer of pol3
lution permitting administration to the Arizona state government. '
After this transfer, Arizona could voluntarily engage in the consultation process prior to issuing pollution permits, but the EPA could
3
not direct the state to do so.

2

Addressing the issue of decreased species protection, the Biological Opinion concluded that the loss of the section 7 consultation benefit resulted not from the EPA's decision to approve the
transfer, but instead "reflect[ed] Congress' [s] decision" to give
states the explicit authority to administer permitting programs as
33
long as the state's program complied with CWA requirements.
The Biological Opinion further concluded that "EPA's [Clean
Water Act] - mandated approval of the program has only an attenuated causal link to the reduction in Federal [Endangered Species
Act] conservation responsibilities. '3 4 The Biological Opinion also
offered an alternative to the lack of causation analysis, suggesting
that other federal and state laws provided endangered species sufficient protection, and consequently, the transfer would not likely
35
jeopardize these endangered species or their critical habitats.
On December 5, 2002, the EPA approved Arizona's application
for transfer of pollution permitting authority.3 6 The EPA issued a
notice on December 30, 2002, stating that the Arizona Department
of Environmental Quality (ADEQ) would administer the state's pollution permit program, replacing the NPDES program previously
Under the Clean Water Act and Endangered Species Act, 66 Fed. Reg. 11,202,
11,208-09 (Feb. 22, 2001) (explaining interagency elevation process).
31. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 953 (noting Biological Opinion acknowledged transfer would effectively eliminate federal agency power to consult
developers regarding possible effects of pollution permits on endangered species).
32. See id. (discussing practical effect of EPA's transfer decision).
33. See id. (highlighting Biological Opinion's conclusion explaining reason
for lack of consultation benefit as result of congressional intent).
34. See id. at 954 (referencing Biological Opinion's lack of causation analysis).
35. See id. (describing Biological Opinion's emphasis on alternative methods
of species protection, including ESA section 9, which prohibits "taking" of endangered species). Furthermore, apart from the Biological Opinion's data and conclusions, an Arizona Game and Fish Department official noted that they had
"worked cooperatively with ADEQ [Arizona Department of Environmental Quality]" during assessments of past water pollution permit applications. See id. Additionally, FWS staff recommended the establishment of a memorandum of
understanding with ADEQ or the Arizona State Lands Department to ensure consultation before permit issuance, but no such document was ever produced and
signed. See id.
36. See Approval of Application by Arizona to Administer the National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) Program, 67 Fed. Reg. 79,629 (Dec.
30, 2002) (announcing EPA's approval of Arizona's transfer application).
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operated and managed by the EPA.3 7 The notice additionally

stated that the EPA would continue to maintain "oversight and enforcement authority" after the transfer of permit issuing authority.3 8

In Defenders of Wildlife, petitioners challenged the EPA's

approval of this state-controlled permit program and filed a peti39
tion with the Ninth Circuit to review the EPA's transfer decision.
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

Relationship Between CWA and ESA

Congress passed the CWA and ESA to satisfy similar environmental protection objectives. 40 Enacted in 1972, the CWA aims to
improve the quality of the nation's waterways and to eliminate the
discharge of harmful pollutants into these waters. 4 1 In 1973, Congress enacted the ESA for the purpose of protecting and promoting
the viability of endangered species. 42 Although the goals of the two
statutes appear complementary, their interplay does not always produce clear results. 43 The issues in Defenders of Wildlife center on the
CWA provisions that provide the EPA with the authority to transfer
pollution permitting control to individual states and the ESA requirements that instruct federal agencies to ensure that agency actions do not harm the continued existence or critical habitats of
44
endangered species.
37. See id. (noting that EPA's decision to approve Arizona's transfer application included examination and consideration of comments and issues arising from
public comment period).
38. See id. (describing EPA action under CWA section 1342(b)).
39. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 955 (setting forth procedural history of
case). Petitioners also filed an Endangered Species Act and Administrative Procedure Act lawsuit in Arizona district court, which included a claim that the Biological Opinion used to support the EPA's decision did not conform to ESA standards.
See id. The district court found that the Ninth Circuit held exclusive jurisdiction
over review of that claim and ordered the claim severed from the action and transferred to the Ninth Circuit for consolidation with petitioners' other claim challenging the transfer decision. See id.
40. See Melanie J. Rowland, The Clean Water Act and ESA Consultation in the
Northwest, SK056 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 197, 199 (Apr. 6-8, 2005) (discussing compatibility of
ESA and CWA).
41. See 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (a) (2000) (declaring congressional purpose of
CWA). The CWA's purpose is "[r]estoration and maintenance of chemical, physical and biological integrity of the Nation's waters." See id.
42. See 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2000) (stating purpose of ESA as providing measures to ensure conservation of endangered and threatened species).
43. See Rowland, supra note 40, at 199 (explaining that interplay is complicated due in part to differences in standards, regulations and procedures).
44. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 950-51 (explaining relevant sections of
CWA and ESA).
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The CWA gives the EPA Administrator the authority to issue
45
permits to discharge pollutants into the nation's navigable waters.
CWA section 1342(b) sets forth the provisions and procedures governing the transfer of permitting authority to the states. 46 The statute provides that the EPA Administrator "shall approve" a state's
transfer application "unless he determines that adequate authority
does not exist" based on the consideration of nine enumerated criteria.4 7 After the EPA transfers permitting authority to the state,
the EPA Administrator oversees the state's administration of its per48
mitting program.
The argument concerning the intersection of the CWA and
ESA in Defenders of Wildlife centers on ESA section 7(a) (2), which
requires federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior to ensure that agency actions are not "likely to jeopardize the
continued existence of an endangered species or threatened species or result in the destruction or adverse modification of habitat
of such species." 4 9 The regulatory provisions established for ESA
enforcement provide that section 7 requirements "apply to all actions in which there is discretionary Federal involvement or con45. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (1) (outlining EPA Administrator's permit issuing
authority under statute).
46. See id. § 1342(b) (outlining state permit program approval process).
47. See id. (listing nine requirements for approval of state permit programs).
The nine enumerated criteria include authority to: (1) issue permits that comply
with relevant statutory sections, do not exceed five years and are capable of termination or modification for cause; (2) inspect, monitor, enter and require reports;
(3) guarantee that issued permits will be made public; (4) make certain that EPA
Administrator receives notification and copies of permit applications; (5) insure
that other states whose waters may be impacted by issuing state's permits may be
notified and given opportunity to submit written recommendations; (6) guarantee
that no permits will be issued if the Secretary of the Army, in consultation with the
Secretary of the department where the Coast Guard is operating, determines that
the permit would interfere with water navigation; (7) decrease violations of permits or permit program through imposition of penalties and other methods of
enforcement; (8) insure that a pollution permit for a publicly owned treatment
works contains provisions requiring the identification of character and volume of
pollutants; and (9) guarantee that industrial users of a publicly owned treatment
works will act in accordance with the requirements of the pertinent CWA sections.
See id,
48. See id. § 1342(c) (setting forth procedure following EPA approval of state
applications). The Administrator's role as overseer includes authority to withdraw
approval of the state program. See id. If the Administrator holds a public hearing
and finds the "State is not administering a program approved under this section in
accordance with requirements of this section, he shall so notify the State and, if
appropriate corrective action is not taken within a reasonable time, not to exceed
ninety days, the Administrator shall withdraw approval of such program." See id.
§ 1342(c) (3).
49. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2) (outlining federal agency duty to protect endangered species under ESA).
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Significantly, the ESA's language specifically names only

federal agencies as subject to the section 7 consultation requirement. 51 Thus, the ESA does not require state governments to con-

duct the consultation process prior to taking actions that might
52
affect endangered species or their critical habitats.

B.

United States Supreme Court Precedent Interpreting the
ESA- Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill

In 1978, five years after the ESA's enactment, the United States
Supreme Court in Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill (Tennessee Valley) 53 heralded the statute as "the most comprehensive legislation
for the preservation of endangered species ever enacted by any nation. '54 The Court's interpretation of the section 7 consultation requirement provides guidance for agency obligations with respect to
the preservation of endangered species. 55 In interpreting the language of section 7 and its delegation of species preservation responsibility to agencies, the Court emphasized that the ESA's plain
meaning "affirmatively command[s]" federal agencies to actively
ensure that agency actions do not jeopardize the lives or critical
habitats of endangered species. 56 The Court's examination of the
ESA's legislative history also supported the interpretation that Congress intended agencies "to afford first priority to the declared na57
tional policy of saving endangered species."

50. See 50 C.F.R. pt. 402.03 (2005) (defining applicability of ESA section

7

requirements).
51. See Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 951 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting
scope of ESA's section 7 requirements). See also Rosan, supra note 1, at 459 (highlighting that ESA consultation requirement applies only to federal actions permitting discretionary involvement or control).

52. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 951 (identifying ESA's duty to consult,
as applicable, with federal agency decisions but not state decisions).
53. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
54. See id. at 180 (discussing endangered species protection under ESA).

55. See id. at 173 (discussing ESA's express delegation of consultation duty to
federal agencies).
56. See id. (emphasizing plain language of statute requires agencies to evaluate impacts of agency actions on endangered species).
57. See id. at 181, 185 (finding Congress's intentional abandonment of prior
draft language requiring agencies to preserve endangered species only as practicable and consistent with agencies' purposes indicated clear intent to make species
preservation high priority).
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Circuit Court Split Concerning the Scope of ESA Authority
When Agencies Act Pursuant to Other Statutes

Since the Supreme Court's Tennessee Valley decision, circuit
courts have split over whether ESA section 7's species preservation
provisions apply when the EPA or other federal agencies are exercising authority and acting pursuant to another statute. 5 8 The First
Circuit in Conservation Law Foundation of New England v. Andrus
(Conservation Law Foundation)59 and the Eighth Circuit in Defenders
of Wildlife v. Administrator (Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator)60
both found that federal agencies must comply with ESA require61
ments even when acting under the authority of a separate statute.
By contrast, recent decisions have articulated a more restrictive view
of the scope of a federal agency's authority. 6 2 The Fifth Circuit in
American Forest & PaperAss'n v. EPA (American Forest)63 and the District of Columbia Circuit in Platte River Whooping Crane Critical
Habitat Maintenance Trust v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(Platte River)64 each held that the ESA did not enlarge an agency's
65
authority if another statute constrained that authority.
1. Broad View of Agency Authority Under ESA
In Conservation Law Foundation, the First Circuit considered
whether the Secretary of the Interior's plan to lease tracts of land
for oil and gas exploration, development and production violated
ESA section 7(d).66 This section prohibits agency activities involving "any irreversible or irretrievable commitment of resources" that
prevent the development of alternative endangered species protec58. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d 946, 969-70 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging circuit split over scope of authority ESA provides).
59. 623 F.2d 712 (1st Cir. 1979).
60. 882 F.2d 1294 (8th Cir. 1989).
61. See Conservation Law Foundation, 623 F.2d at 715 (holding ESA requirements continued to apply when Secretary of Interior acted under Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act authority); see also Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator,882 F.2d
at 1299 (finding EPA must comply with ESA when acting under Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act).
62. For a discussion of other circuit courts' narrow construction of the EPA's
ESA authority when acting in conjunction with authority provided by a separate
statute, see infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text.
63. 137 F.3d 291 (5th Cir. 1998).
64. 962 F.2d 27 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
65. See American Forest, 137 F.3d at 294 (holding EPA could not exercise much
discretion when deciding whether to approve state permitting program applications); see also Platte River, 962 F.2d at 34 (finding ESA did not expand authority
established by agency's enabling act).
66. See Conservation Law Foundation,623 F.2d at 714 (explaining claim asserted
in case).
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tion measures. 67 The Foundation asserted that once the defendant
sold the leases, the Secretary could only cancel them through compliance with the standards of the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act (OCSLA), which are less comprehensive and less strict than
those of the ESA. 68 The Foundation claimed that the loss of the

more stringent ESA requirements would result in lease sales that
committed valuable resources to projects that threatened endangered species. 69 The First Circuit found that addressing the issue
was unnecessary because the standards of the two statutes were
complementary, and the ESA preservation requirements remained
in place and applied to the Secretary's actions following the lease
sales. 70 Thus, before negotiating a lease under authority of the OCSLA, the Secretary must ensure that the terms of the lease would
permit ESA compliance and not result in harm to endangered
71
species.
The Eighth Circuit reached a similar decision in Defenders of
Wildlife v. Administrator.2 In that case, environmental interest
groups brought an action against the EPA Administrator and the
Secretary of the Interior seeking to ban the use of pesticides containing strychnine on land surfaces. 73 Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), companies must
register pesticides with the EPA prior to the products' sale or distribution to the public.74 The plaintiffs claimed that the EPA's registration of three strychnine pesticides violated the ESA's
endangered species protection provisions. 75 The defendants argued that the plaintiffs' registration challenges could only be
brought pursuant to FIFRA, and thus, they had no independent
67. See id. (setting forth statutory provisions at issue).
68. See id. at 714-15 (explaining Conservation Law Foundation's claims that

Secretary's actions threatened loss of ESA protections).
69. See id. (describing effect of not requiring Secretary to consider ESA section 7(d) limitation on commitment of resources).
70. See id. (explaining Secretary will not take action under OSCLA unless certain that action will not jeopardize endangered species as required under ESA).
71. See Conservation Law Foundation, 623 F.2d at 714-15 (explaining reasoning
was analogous to fundamental rule of contract law providing that contracts will not
be interpreted in such manner as would make them illegal).
72. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator,882 F.2d 1294, 1299 (8th Cir. 1989)
(relying on Conservation Law Foundation court's reasoning that ESA obligations applied to Secretary's actions taken under authority of FIFRA).
73. See id. at 1296 (describing parties and reason for lawsuit).
74. See id. (explaining FIFRA gives EPA authority to approve pesticide registration applications when normal use of pesticide will not result in harmful environmental effects).
75. See id. at 1298, 1300 (describing plaintiffs' ESA challenges to EPA registration decisions).
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cause of action under the ESA. 76 Analyzing the applicability of the
ESA to the EPA's authority to regulate pesticides pursuant to
FIFRA, the Eighth Circuit held that acting under FIFRA did not
exempt the EPA from complying with the ESA requirements during
the pesticide registration process. 7 7 Like the First Circuit in Conservation Law Foundation,the Eighth Circuit determined that the EPA
must comply with ESA endangered species protection provisions
78
before acting on its authority under a separate statute.
2.

Restrictive View of Agency Authority Under ESA

In contrast to these broad interpretations of agency authority
under the ESA, the Fifth Circuit found that the EPA lacked authority to take action pursuant to the ESA when the CWA did not explicitly provide that authority. 79 In American Forest,the plaintiff claimed
that the EPA lacked authority to deny the issuance of a pollution
permit granted by the State of Louisiana.8 0 The EPA had previously
approved Louisiana's CWA application for the transfer of administrative control over pollution permit issuance, but the EPA retained
the right to veto any permits that the FWS and NMFS classified as a
threat to endangered species. 8 ' Interpreting the EPA's power to
transfer permitting authority under the CWA as a non-discretionary
action that "does not enjoy wide latitude," the Fifth Circuit held
that the EPA lacked the statutory authority to impose ESA restrictions when a state otherwise satisfied the nine criteria enumerated
82
in the CWA.
In the D.C. Circuit's Platte River decision, the Platte River
Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maintenance Trust (Trust) re76. See id. at 1298-99 (noting defendants' main contention in response to
plaintiffs' arguments).
77. See Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator,882 F.2d at 1299 (explaining agencies must comply with ESA requirements even when acting pursuant to another
statute).
78. See id. (finding EPA must consider environmental effects of pesticides
prior to registration under FIFRA).
79. See Am. Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291, 293-94, 297 (5th Cir.
1998) (holding EPA's duty under CWA was non-discretionary).
80. See id. at 294, 296 (noting plaintiffs claim that EPA's retention of right to
revoke state-issued permits exceeded its statutory authority and would result in
excessive costs to plaintiff).
81. See id. at 293-94 (describing EPA's conditioned approval of Louisiana's
transfer application).
82. See id. at 294, 297 (citing its decision in Save the Bay, Inc. v. EPA, 556 F.2d
1282, 1285 and n.3 (5th Cir. 1977)). The court in Save the Bay held that the CWA
listed the requirements a state program must meet to obtain approval and
"[u]nless the Administrator of EPA determines that the proposed state program
does not meet these requirements, he must approve the proposal." See id.
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quested that the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
consider the need for wildlife protection before issuing licenses to
the Trust for the operation of hydroelectric projects pursuant to its
authority under the Federal Power Act (FPA). 83 The Trust relied
on ESA section 7 to support its claim that the FERC was required to
do "whatever it takes" to protect the threatened and endangered
species that populated the Platte River basin area. 84 The D.C. Circuit found the Trust's interpretation of the ESA to be "far-fetched"
and emphasized that the statute did not enlarge the agency's authority granted under its enabling act. 85 The court denied the
Trust's petition to review the FERC's issuance of licenses for hydroelectric projects based on its conclusion that the FERC had violated

ESA section
D.

7.86

Ninth Circuit Precedent Interpreting the Scope of Agency
Authority Under ESA

The Ninth Circuit had not previously addressed the precise issue presented in Defenders of Wildlife, but it has interpreted the statutory and regulatory language involved in the case. 87 In Washington
Toxics Coalition v. EPA (Washington Toxics),88 the plaintiffs claimed
that the EPA failed to consult the NMFS concerning the potentially
89
harmful effects of pesticides registered by the EPA under FIFRA.
The EPA contended that its authority to rescind pesticide registrations lay in FIFRA, not the ESA. 90 Relying on the Eighth Circuit's
reasoning in Defenders of Wildlife v. Administrator, the Ninth Circuit
held that the EPA must comply with the ESA in conjunction with its
83. See Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. FERC, 962
F.2d 27, 30 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (noting environmental groups' claim that FERC's interpretation of its authority was "insufficiently aggressive or imaginative").
84. See id. at 34 (explaining Trust's position that any limitations of authority
under FPA were "implicitly superseded" by provisions of ESA's section 7).
85. See id. (explaining court's rejection of Trust's statutory interpretation).
The D.C. Circuit additionally noted that its holding in Platte River did not contradict the Supreme Court's holding in Tennessee Valley, which did not rule on the
issue of whether section 7 permits agencies to exceed statutory authority to serve
ESA objectives. See id.
86. See id. (denying plaintiffs' petition for review and noting that Tennessee
Valley did not stand as contrary precedent).
87. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the ESA and corresponding regulations in prior court precedent, see infra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
88. 413 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2005).
89. See id. at 1030 (alleging violations of ESA section 7(a) (2)).
90. See id. (explaining EPA's argument that it lacked authority to rescind pesticide registrations).
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registration of pesticides pursuant to FIFRA. 9 1 In reaching this decision, the court rejected the EPA's argument that it had no legal
authority to act under the ESA once it had registered pesticides
pursuant to FIFRA framework because the EPA retained an "ongo92
ing regulatory authority" over pesticide registrations.

IV.
A.

NARRTvIE ANALYSIs

Review of the Legal Basis for the EPA's Approval of Arizona's
Transfer Application

In reviewing the EPA's decision under the arbitrary and capricious standard, the Ninth Circuit analyzed whether the EPA relied
on coherent, internally consistent and well-explained reasoning
when reaching its conclusion. 93 Applying this test, the court found
the EPA relied. on legally contradictory positions concerning its
94
ESA section 7 responsibilities.
The EPA first asserted that it must, in compliance with its ESA
duties, engage in the consultation process prior to making permitting authority transfer decisions. 9 5 During the course of its decision-making process, the EPA noted that ESA section 7(a) (2)
required consultation with the FWS to determine any possible
threat to endangered species that could arise from approval of Arizona's state permitting program application. 9 6 The EPA's second
assertion, however, suggested that the agency was prohibited under
federal law from considering the potential harmful effects to en97
dangered species caused by the transfer of permitting authority.
The EPA relied on the Biological Opinion in deciding to approve
91. See id. at 1032 (explaining reasoning for holding that EPA must comply

with ESA when acting under FIFRA authority).
92. See id. at 1033 (describing EPA's misplaced reliance on cases where agency
authority and obligation ended because activity did not require "ongoing regulatory authority").
93. See Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 959 (9th Cir. 2005) (examining consistency and coherency of EPA's reasoning). To withstand arbitrary and
capricious review, an agency decision must be "rational, based on consideration of
the relevant factors and within the scope of the authority delegated to the agency
by the statute." See id. An agency action will be deemed arbitrary and capricious if
it is inconsistent with the agency's governing statute or if the agency's decisionmaking process involved internally contradictory reasoning. See id.
94. See id. (finding EPA's decision was based on inconsistent reasoning).
95. See id. at 961 (explaining "the two propositions that underlie the EPA's
action").
96. See id. at 959-60 (citing Memorandum of Agreement as well as FWS and
EPA notices stating that consultation about potential effects on endangered species was required before approving application).
97. See id. at 960-61 (noting Biological Opinion's conclusion that EPA lacked
authority to deny transfer applications based on potential harm to endangered
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Arizona's application.9 8 This Opinion contended that the EPA had
no legal authority to base its consideration of the application on the
results of the FWS consultation. 99 The Ninth Circuit concluded
that the EPA's decision-making process involved contradictory views
of the same language in ESA section 7(a)(2), and consequently, the
10 0
EPA's decision was not based on reasoned decision-making.
The Ninth Circuit also found the Biological Opinion's lack of
direct causation analysis unconvincing because it failed to consider
that certain events result from multiple causes. 10 1 In its analysis,
the Opinion reasoned that private development resulting from the
transfer decision, rather than the decision itself, would affect endangered species.10 2 Concluding that the two actions togetherthe EPA's approval of Arizona's transfer application and private development decisions-represented a potential threat to endangered species, the court held that the Opinion's lack of causation
10 3
analysis did not meet the reasoned decision-making standard.
B.

Statutory Authority Provided by ESA Section 7

The Ninth Circuit next decided whether ESA section 7 obliges
agencies to insure that all federal actions are not likely to jeopardize endangered species. 10 4 In rejecting the EPA's arguments, the
court determined that the loss of potential benefits arising from
compulsory consultation should have been included in the Biological Opinion as an "indirect effect" of the transfer approval.1 0 5 Because it construed the EPA's transfer decision as a cause of the loss
species, which conflicted with EPA's assertion that it needed to conduct ESA section 7 endangered species consultations prior to making transfer decision).
98. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 961 (discussing EPA's reliance on Bio-

logical Opinion's reasoning).
99. See id. at 961 (explaining Biological Opinion's suggestion that scope of
EPA's authority in making its decision was limited).
100. See id. (finding EPA relied on inconsistent reasoning in making transfer
decision).
101. See id. (asserting several events in causal chain lead to ultimate event).
102. See id. (explaining Biological Opinion's lack of causation argument).
103. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 962 (recognizing events can have multiple causes). The court concluded that "the two sets of decisions together-the
private development decisions and the governmental transfer decision-but not
either one independently, have the potential to affect listed species and their

habitat." See id.
104. See id. at 962 (determining issue of statutory power to protect species).
105. See id. at 962-63 (quoting 40 C.F.R. pt. 1508.8 (2005)). The regulation

defines indirect effects as those "caused by the action and are later in time or
farther removed in distance, but are still reasonably foreseeable." See id.
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of consultation benefits, the court concluded that the EPA should
10 6
have considered this effect when making the transfer decision.
The Ninth Circuit next concluded that, based on the Supreme
Court's decision in Tennessee Valley, an agency's duty to "insure" that
its actions prevent the likelihood of harm to endangered species
was a duty "in addition to those created by the agencies' own governing statute."10 7 In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit
discussed the Supreme Court's analysis in Tennessee Valley, which asserted that the ESA's legislative history supported the position that
an agency must act to protect endangered species to the fullest ex-

tent "consistent with [the agency's] purpose."1 0 8 The Ninth Circuit
further concluded that ESA Amendments passed in 1978 did not
alter Tennessee Valey's interpretation of an agency's duty to give precedence to the protection of endangered species.' 0 9
The Ninth Circuit then considered whether the EPA's decision
to transfer pollution permitting authority to Arizona was the kind
of agency action that triggered the ESA's consultation obligation.' 10
In deciding this issue, the Ninth Circuit rejected the same argument by Arizona and the Chamber of Commerce that because the
CWA specifies the EPA "shall approve" state applications which satisfy nine enumerated criteria, the EPA lacks discretion to consider
impacts on endangered species when making its decision."' l

106. See id. at 962-63 (explaining when requisite nexus between agency action
and action's impact on endangered species is present). The court describes a
nexus as existing when "a negative impact on listed species is the likely direct or
indirect effect of an agency's action only if the agency has some control over that
result." See id.
107. See id. at 964-67 (citing Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 180
(1978)) (identifying Tennessee Valley decision as Court's seminal section 7 case and
describing its interpretation of ESA as granting broad authority to agencies for
ensuring protection of endangered species).
108. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 964-65 (discussing Supreme Court's
analysis of ESA legislative history in Tennessee Valley decision).
109. See id. at 966 (quoting H.R.RIP.No. 95-1625, at 10 (1978)) (discussing
Congress's understanding of Tennessee Valley's holding). The court quoted the
House Report's statement of Congress's interpretation of Tennessee Valley as finding
that "[t]he pointed omission of any type of qualifying language in the statute revealed congressional intent to give the continued existence of endangered species priority
over the primary missions of federal agencies." See id. (emphasis added by court in Defenders of Wildlife).
110. See id. at 967 (addressing whether EPA's transfer decision was action "authorized, funded, or carried out" by agency as set forth in ESA).
111. See id. (quoting Washington Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1032 (9th
Cir. 2005)) (citing holding that agency cannot ignore duty to comply with ESA
simply based on its obligation under another statute with complementary
objectives).
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The court rejected this argument for two reasons. 1 2 First, the
EPA did not assert an argument that its transfer decision was not
"discretionary" within the provisions of chapter 50, section 402.03
of the Code of Federal Regulations, which governs the CWA. 1 3 Because the court customarily defers to an agency's interpretation of
its regulation, and here, the EPA did not interpret this action as
non-discretionary within the meaning of the regulation, the court
14
would not construe it as such.'
Second, the Ninth Circuit found that cases applying section
402.03 were consistent with its interpretation of the regulation's reference to "discretionary ... involvement" as having the same mean-

ing as the ESA's reference to actions "authorized, funded, or
carried out" by the agency.' 15 The Ninth Circuit relied on Washington Toxics, holding that ESA section 7 was inapplicable in discretionary involvement or control cases if the agency had "no ongoing
regulatory authority" over the decision-making process.11 6 The
Ninth Circuit thus concluded that because the EPA exercised exclusive, ongoing authority over the decision to approve Arizona's per117
mitting program application, ESA section 7 obligations applied.
Summarizing its conclusions, the Ninth Circuit held that the
EPA's approval of Arizona's permitting program application was an
"authorized" agency action which triggered ESA section 7(a) (2) requirements prohibiting agencies from taking actions that would
threaten or jeopardize endangered species.' 1 8 Furthermore, the
court found the Biological Opinion improperly disregarded the potentially harmful indirect effect that the loss of ESA section 7 con112. For a discussion of the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in rejecting the argu-

ment that the EPA lacked authority to deny Arizona's transfer application, see infra
notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
113. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 968 (explaining first reason for rejecting argument that CWA criteria preclude application of ESA section 7 consultation requirements).
114. See id. (explaining reason for not interpreting transfer decision as nondiscretionary within meaning of governing regulation).
115. See id. at 968 (noting second reason for dismissing argument that CWA
precludes EPA from exercising discretion over transfer decisions). The court also
explained the second reason in different words, stating that "imposing section
7(a) (2)'s substantive requirements in those cases would have gone beyond the limited command of the statute." See id.
116. See id. (explaining agency was not responsible for actions taken when it
no longer had authority).
117. See id. at 969 (finding EPA's transfer decision triggered ESA section 7
duties). Because the EPA held complete control over the decision to authorize the
transfer of pollution permitting authority, section 7 consultation provisions were
required. See id.
118. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 971 (finding compliance with "complementary" statute like CWA did not release EPA from ESA duties).
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sultation benefits could have on endangered species. 119 The court
found that the failure to include this data rendered the Biological
Opinion deficient, and the EPA erred in relying on this deficient
Opinion when approving the transfer.' 20 Finding the EPA's action
to be legally flawed, the court vacated the EPA's decision to approve
121
Arizona's pollution permitting application.
In addressing the circuit split concerning the scope of the
EPA's power under the provisions of the ESA, the Ninth Circuit
found the D.C. Circuit and Fifth Circuit decisions unpersuasive in
its resolution of the questions presented. 122 The Ninth Circuit
found that the D.C. Circuit in Platte River failed to properly distinguish between the language and purpose of ESA sections 7(a) (1)
and 7(a) (2), including the significance of the word "insure" in section 7(a) (2).123 Similarly, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Fifth
Circuit's decision in American Forest improperly relied on Platte
River's conclusion that ESA section 7 (a) (2) did not authorize the
EPA to consult with the FWS prior to transferring permitting authority. 124 Additionally, the Ninth Circuit in Defenders of Wildlife disagreed with the Fifth Circuit's interpretation that the ESA's
"consultation and assurance aspects" constituted independent duties.1 2 5 Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the First
Circuit's Conservation Law Foundation decision and the Eighth Circuit's Defenders of Wildlife v. Administratordecision provided the "better reasoned" support for its holding that the ESA gives EPA
authority to base its pollution permitting program applications on
126
the consideration of potential impacts to endangered species.

119. See id. (explaining EPA transfer decision is cause of harmful impacts that
flow from development of subsequent water projects).
120. See id. (noting Biological Opinion ignored indirect effects but acknowl-

edged that section 7 consultations had saved species' critical habitats in prior
situations).
121. See id. at 979 (remanding petition to EPA for proceedings consistent with
Ninth Circuit's Defenders of Wildlife opinion).
122. See id. at 970 (discussing holdings and reasoning of other circuits).
123. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 970 (explaining deficiencies in D.C.
Circuit's Platte River decision). The court additionally noted that the D.C. Circuit
failed to consider the ESA's legislative history, which indicates a clear congressional intent to avoid approving amendments that would limit the authority
granted under the ESA. See id. at 970-71.
124. See id. at 971 (finding reliance on Platte River reasoning was faulty).
125. See id. (finding Fifth Circuit's reasoning to be incorrect).
126. See id. at 970-71 (concluding that First and Eighth Circuits as well as
Ninth Circuit precedent provided more reasoned foundation for holding in Defenders of Wildlife).
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C.

Dissenting Opinion

Senior Circuit Judge Thompson dissented in Defenders of Wildlife because he disagreed with the majority's conclusion that the
EPA held the authority to give weight to the effects on endangered
species and critical habitats when considering a state's pollution
permitting program transfer application. 127 In support of this position, the dissent noted that Ninth Circuit precedent held that an
agency had no discretion to take action when the agency lacked the
authority to act for the benefit of endangered species.' 28 Additionally, the dissent found the majority's interpretation of the ESA regulations defining discretionary actions too expansive. 129 The dissent
argued that the majority misconstrued the "discretionary involvement" provision when it found that language to encompass any action that falls within an agency's decision-making power. 130 This
interpretation of the regulatory language contradicted Ninth Circuit precedent, which, the dissent maintained, held that an agency
could have decision-making authority in certain cases but still not

have the power, either independently or in connection with a separate authority, to act on behalf of endangered species under ESA
section 7.131

The dissent also argued that the CWA's language restricted the
EPA's authority to consider only the nine criteria listed in the statute when reviewing transfer applications. 13 2 Because Congress established this closed list of nine criteria, the dissent concluded that
the statute did not allow the EPA to require states to meet additional conditions. 13 3 The CWA's language did not give the EPA discretion to deny an application that met the specified criteria, and
127. See id. at 979 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (explaining reasons for disagreement with majority opinion).
128. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 979 (Thompson,J., dissenting) (citing
Ninth Circuit cases limiting agency discretion to act on behalf of endangered
species).
129. See id. (Thompson, J., dissenting) (finding Ninth Circuit precedent did
not interpret "discretionary involvement" as broadly as majority opinion).
130. See id. (Thompson, J., dissenting) (explaining majority opinion's broad
interpretation of section 402.03's "discretionary involvement" language).
131. See id. at 979-80 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (listing Ninth Circuit cases
where agencies lacked discretionary authority to act and engaged in section 7
consultation).
132. See id. at 980 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (highlighting CWA language
stating that EPA "shall approve" state permitting program application if it meets
nine enumerated criteria).
133. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 980 (Thompson, J., dissenting)
(agreeing agencies must comply with ESA section 7 consultation when acting
under separate, complementary statute but making distinction that CWA has only
nine "exclusive" criteria).
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thus, its decision did not constitute an "agency action" requiring
13 4
ESA section 7 obligations.
V.

CRITICAL ANALYSIS

In interpreting the ESA section 7 provisions as applicable to
the EPA's decision-making capacities under the CWA, the Ninth
Circuit improperly expanded the EPA's authority when considering
approval of state pollution permitting program applications. 135 Because the CWA explicitly defines the exclusive requirements that
the state must meet for EPA approval of state pollution permitting
programs, the Ninth Circuit erred in broadly construing the EPA's
authority to deny state applications based on outside factors such as
13 6
the potential harm to endangered species.
The Ninth Circuit's holding that the EPA must engage in ESA
section 7 endangered species consultation when assessing state permitting applications is inconsistent with the EPA's statutory duty
under the plain language of the CWA and the CWA's explicit purpose.13 7 The language of the CWA does not provide the EPA with
absolute discretion over the approval of a state's pollution permitting program application.1 38 Instead, the statute authorizes the
EPA to consider a list of nine criteria when determining whether to
transfer permitting authority to the states.' 39 Pursuant to the language of the CWA, if the state meets these requirements, the EPA
140
Administrator "shall approve" the proposed permitting program.
This statutory language does not permit the EPA to consider
outside factors when making transfer decisions. 14 1 Congress's use
134. See id. (Thompson,J., dissenting) (finding transfer decision did not qualify as "agency action" sufficient to prompt ESA section 7 consultation
requirements).
135. See id. (Thompson, J., dissenting) (reasoning EPA lacked discretionary
authority to consider endangered species effects when evaluating Arizona's pollution permitting program application).
136. See id. (Thompson, J., dissenting) (emphasizing CWA permits EPA to
consider only nine enumerated criteria).
137. See id. (Thompson, J., dissenting) (noting imposition of ESA section 7
consultation in transfer decision would be inconsistent with statutory language and
CWA objectives).
138. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 980 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (finding EPA lacked discretionary authority to act pursuant to ESA section 7).
139. See id. (Thompson, J., dissenting) (emphasizing language of CWA limiting EPA to consideration of only nine criteria set forth in statute).
140. See 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (listing criteria states must meet for permit pro-

gram approval).
141. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 980 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (stating "Congressional directive [in CWA section 1342(b)] does not permit EPA to
impose additional conditions"). See also Am. Forest & PaperAss'n v. EPA, 137 F.3d
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of the word "shall" in drafting the CWA indicates that the EPA's
authority to grant transfer applications is compulsory, rather than
discretionary, if the nine exclusive criteria are satisfied. 142 In expanding the EPA's authority beyond the scope of the CWA's provisions, the Ninth Circuit's interpretation fails to satisfy Congress's
intent to give states and local enforcement a primary role in the
143
regulation of water pollution.
Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit's broad construction of the
regulatory language defining the scope of discretionary actions requiring ESA section 7 compliance did not properly apply to the
circumstances in Defenders of Wildlife.144 The majority broadly interpreted ESA regulatory section 402.03's "discretionary involvement"
language to mean that any action involving an agency's decisionmaking authority necessarily invoked ESA section 7 requirements"14 5 Because the CWA provides the EPA no discretion to act
on behalf of endangered species when evaluating Arizona's pollution permitting program application, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly

291, 297 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding CWA language is "firm" on issue of EPA's authority to approve program applications unless they do not satisfy all nine enumerated criteria).
142. See William C. Ellis, Note, May the EPA Condition Approval of State Proposals
for Administering the NPDES on Adherence to CriteriaNot Enumerated in the Clean Water
Act?, 7 Mo. ENv-rL. L. & POL'Y REv. 93, 98 (2000) (recognizing CWA statutory language makes EPA approval decisions mandatory if nine criteria are met).
143. See Elizabeth Evensen, Fifth CircuitRejects EPA Rule Requiring State and Federal Agency Consultation as a Preconditionfor State PermittingPrograms, 19 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 129, 130 n.10 (1999) (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b)). Section
1251 (b) provides that "[i]
t is the policy of the Congress to recognize, preserve, and
protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to prevent, reduce, and
eliminate pollution, to plan the development and use . . .of land and water resources... ." See id. See also Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 980-81 (Thompson, J.,
dissenting) (quoting CWA section 1251 (b) language cited above and noting additional statutory language providing "that the States will manage ... and implement" NPDES pollution permitting program).
144. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 979-80 (Thompson, J., dissenting)
(noting EPA lacked discretion to reject Arizona's transfer application).
145. See id. at 979 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with majority's expansive interpretation of ESA regulatory language). The dissent noted that this
broad interpretation contradicted other Ninth Circuit precedent concerning that
regulatory language, which has repeatedly acknowledged that an agency may have
decision-making authority but still lack the discretionary power to act on behalf of
endangered species. See id. at 979-80. In support of this contention, the dissent
cited several cases, including Marbled Murrelet v. Babbitt, 83 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir.
1996) and Sierra Club v. Babbitt, 65 F.3d 1502 (9th Cir. 1995), to demonstrate that
certain authorized agency actions do not fall within the meaning of "discretionary
involvement" as needed to invoke ESA section 7 requirements. See id.
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concluded
authority.

146

that ESA section

7 provided such

discretionary

For the reasons outlined above, the Ninth Circuit's reliance on
its Washington Toxics decision was misplaced. 147 In that case, the
Ninth Circuit held that ESA section 7 requirements applied when
an agency maintained "ongoing discretion" over the regulation of
pesticide registrations. 148 Thus, the EPA continued to have the
duty to act on behalf of endangered species throughout the life of
the pesticide registration, and these ongoing ESA section 7 obligations authorized the EPA to modify registrations in response to endangered species concerns. 149 By contrast, because the CWA does
not provide the EPA with discretionary authority to deny state pollution permitting programs that meet CWA's nine enumerated criteria, ESA section 7 requirements did not apply in Defenders of
Wildlife.150

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit's holding in Defenders of Wildlife
departs from other circuit courts' more recent holdings. 5 1 The
D.C. Circuit and Fifth Circuit both addressed the authority and
duty of an agency under ESA section 7 in connection with the
agency's responsibility under a separate statute. 152 In Platte River,
the D.C. Circuit emphasized that the ESA "does not expand the powers" given to an agency by its enabling act. 153 The D.C. Circuit disagreed with the plaintiff Trust's argument that ESA section 7

146. See id. at 979 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council v. Houston, 146 F.3d 1118, 1125-26 (9th Cir. 1998)) (reasoning that ESA does
not apply to non-discretionary agency actions).
147. See id. at 980 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (citing Washington Toxics decision as support for majority's interpretation of Code of Federal Regulations section 402.03's discretionary involvement language).
148. See Washington Toxics Coal. v. EPA, 413 F.3d 1024, 1033 (9th Cir. 2005)
(finding EPA had "continuing obligation" to consider potential harm to endangered species when acting under its FIFRA authority to register pesticides).
149. See id. (explaining FIFRA provisions do not limit EPA's regulatory duty
under ESA).
150. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 980 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (not-

ing EPA had obligation only to consider state program's ability to satisfy nine specified CWA criteria).
151. See id. at 969-70 (noting circuit split concerning whether ESA grants EPA
authority beyond that granted by other statutes to protect endangered species).

152. For a discussion of the holdings of the D.C. and Fifth Circuit decisions
addressing the EPA's authority under the ESA, see infra notes 153-57 and accompa-

nying text.
153. See Platte River Whooping Crane Critical Habitat Maint. Trust v. ERC, 962
F.2d 27, 34 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (emphasis in original) (finding plaintiffs broad interpretation of agency authority under ESA to be "far-fetched").
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required the FERC to do "whatever it takes" to protect endangered
15 4
species.
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit in American Forest also examined the
scope of the EPA's ESA authority and asserted that the EPA "cannot
invoke the ESA as a means of creating and imposing requirements
that are not authorized by the CWA."' 155 The American Forest court

further noted that Congress could have, but did not, include a
CWA provision explicitly protecting endangered species as it did in
CWA section 1342(b) (6), which gives EPA authority to veto pro156
posed state permit programs that negatively affect navigation.
Congress's inclusion of a provision addressing navigation concerns
as one of the nine enumerated CWA criteria indicates that Congress clearly considered the practical effects of state permitting authority but did not incorporate an endangered species protection
provision among the CWA's specified state program requirements.15 7 As these circuit courts have held, the EPA is authorized
to consider state pollution permitting program applications based
on the consideration of "nine exclusive requirements," which do not
include an endangered species protective measure. 158 The Ninth
Circuit has thus departed from the holdings of other recent circuit
court decisions and effectively enlarged the authority of the EPA
beyond the boundaries established by the CWA. 159
In concluding the EPA had the authority to consider potential
harm to endangered species when evaluating Arizona's CWA permitting program application, the Ninth Circuit incorrectly decided
Defenders of Wildlife and erroneously vacated the EPA's transfer deci154. See id. (disagreeing with plaintiffs argument concerning scope of EPA
authority under ESA section 7).
155. See Am. Forest & Paper Ass'n v. EPA, 137 F.3d 291, 297 (5th Cir. 1998)
(holding EPA's authority regarding state permit.programs under CWA was nondiscretionary).
156. See Laurie K Beale & Beth S. Ginsberg, Clean Water Act and Endangered
Species Act Interface: A PracticalAnalysis, SH041 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 191, 200 (Oct. 23-25,
2002) (explaining Fifth Circuit's reasoning that Congress could have, but did not,
expand CWA permit program requirements to include endangered species protection). See also American Forest, 137 F.3d at 297-98 (finding EPA's claim that CWA
provides minimum rather than exhaustive criteria was "further weakened" by CWA
provision requiring denial of permits that would disrupt navigation channels).
157. See American Forest, 137 F.3d at 297-98 (emphasizing Congress's ability to
include in CWA endangered species protection provision similar to currently enu-

merated navigation protection provision).
158. See Defenders of Wildlife v. EPA, 420 F.3d 946, 980 (9th Cir. 2005) (Thompson, J., dissenting) (describing EPA's authority to approve state transfer applications as confined to evaluation of state's ability to meet nine specified CWA
requirements).
159. See id. at 970-71 (concluding First and Eighth Circuits provided "better
reasoned out-of-circuit authority" than Fifth and D.C. Circuits).
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sion. 160 Because the CWA does not contain language establishing
that the EPA may exercise discretion when deciding whether to approve state pollution permitting program applications that meet
the CWA's nine enumerated criteria, the EPA lacked authority to
deny Arizona's application based on the transfer's potential harm
16 1
to endangered species.
VI.

IMPACT

The Ninth Circuit's decision in Defenders of Wildlife expands the
scope of the EPA's control over approving transfers of pollution
permitting authority to the states. 1 6 2 In extending this authority,
the EPA will have greater power to deny permits based on criteria
63
that fall outside the nine conditions enumerated in the CWA.1
This affirmative application of the ESA to the EPA's decision to approve CWA permit program transfers may have the positive effect
of increasing environmental protection and fostering better preservation of natural resources. 164 Because the Ninth Circuit's decision
effectively returns pollution permitting authority to the federal government, the EPA's fulfillment of its ESA section 7 agency obligations may specifically engender, greater endangered species
65
protection.1
In broadly construing the EPA's authority to act under the
ESA, the Ninth Circuit retreated from the Fifth Circuit's more narrow construction of the statute, which favored industry and state
sovereignty over environmental interests. 166 Because the Ninth Circuit's decision recognized the EPA's authority to impose endan160. See id. at 979 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (noting disagreement with majority's conclusion that EPA had authority to consider endangered species impacts
related to approval of Arizona's pollution permitting program application).
161. See Ellis, supra note 142, at 103 (acknowledging Fifth Circuit correctly
decided American Forestbecause CWA language did not indicate that nine enumerated criteria were minimum guidelines).
162. See Defenders of Wildlife, 420 F.3d at 971 (concluding ESA section 7(a) (2)
conferred obligation on EPA to ensure that transfer decision did not negatively
impact endangered species).
163. See id. at 980-81 (Thompson, J., dissenting) (noting majority incorrectly
interpreted EPA's authority as discretionary).
164. See Mary Jo Pitzl, U.S. To Get Reins of Clean-Water Program; EPA Erred in
Giving Arizona Control of RegulatingPollutionDischarges,THE ARIZONA REPUBLIC, Aug.
25, 2005, at 6B (noting Ninth Circuit decision could benefit endangered species).
165. See id. (observing that federal control over pollution permit issuance
could result in additional endangered species protection). For a discussion of the
absence of state obligation to comply with ESA section 7 consultation requirements, see supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
166. See Ellis, supra note 142, at 103 (noting Fifth Circuit's American Forestdecision "struck a blow for industry").
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gered species protection conditions that are not specifically
enumerated in the CWA, industrial organizations seeking polluting
rights may encounter a more complicated, time-consuming and
comprehensive permit approval process. 16 7 Additionally, this decision may affect the uniformity of state program transfer decisions
because the requirements for approval will not necessarily be confined to the criteria provided in the statute and could be based on
various other factors.' 68 In making the state program approval process more difficult, the Ninth Circuit's decision represents a potential limit on state assumption of pollution permitting authority,
which contravenes the congressional intent underlying the CWA's
169
enactment.
The debate concerning the scope of the EPA's ESA endangered species protection obligations when acting pursuant to its authority under separate governing statutes, like the CWA, has
created a circuit split.' 70 The Ninth Circuit's Defenders of Wildlife decision, which is the latest case to address the issue, represents a
broad interpretation of the EPA's statutory authority under the
ESA. Due to conflict among the circuits, the Supreme Court may
need to intervene to establish the extent of the EPA's authority
under ESA section 7.171 The Ninth Circuit's Defenders of Wildlife de-

cision further indicates the potential need for Congress to reconsider the current CWA provisions for state permitting programs and
draft statutory language clarifying whether the nine enumerated
criteria are comprehensive or open-ended requirements. 172 In taking a position contrary to other circuits, the Ninth Circuit's Defenders of Wildlife decision makes clear that for purposes of national
uniformity with respect to the EPA's authority as a federal agency,
167. See Evensen, supra 143, at 144 (noting Fifth Circuit's American Forest decision would be beneficial for industry because permit approval process would not
be "unnecessarily prolonged and complicated"). See also Pitzl, supra note 164, at
6B (observing Ninth Circuit's decision "could affect development statewide").
168. See Ellis, supra 142, at 102 (observing Fifth Circuit's American Forest decision could result in uniform state program application approvals because decisions
would necessarily be based on set criteria listed in CWA).
169. For a discussion of Congress's intent to give states a primary role in the
regulation of water pollution, see supra note 143 and accompanying text.
170. For a discussion of the conflicting positions of the circuit courts concerning the scope of the EPA's ESA obligations, see supra notes 58-86 and accompanying text.
171. See Evensen, supra note 143, at 143 (suggesting need for Supreme Court
clarification of ESA section 7 authority following Fifth Circuit's American Forest
decision).
172. See Ellis, supra note 142, at 103 (noting controversy in American Forest
could have been avoided if Congress indicated whether CWA provisions were exhaustive or discretionary).
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Supreme Court review or congressional action will likely be necessary to resolve the statutory conflict.
Mary Beth Hubner
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